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NIETZSCHE AND THE NAZIS: 
THE IMPACT OF NATIONAL SOCIALISM ON 
THE PHILOSOPHY OF NIETZSCHE 
Charles M. Yablon* 
INTRODUCTION 
Time moves in only one direction, but causation moves in 
two. That prior events affect those that follow is fundamental to 
our understanding of the world, Humean skepticism 
notwithstanding. But almost equally fundamental to our modem 
understanding of the world is the realization that absolute 
knowledge of the past is not possible, that our perception of 
historical events must always and inevitably be shaped by current 
concerns and perspectives, including our knowledge and judgment 
about events subsequent to those being studied. In short, the past 
affects the future, but the future also affects the past. 
This is perhaps particularly true when the historical subjects 
involved are not discrete and isolated events, like the Second 
Punic War or the reign of Henry the Eighth, but philosophical 
ideas associated with a particular historical figure. Two forms of 
philosophical history uneasily co-exist within the modern academy. 
One seeks, within the limitations of all historical inquiry, to 
understand the works of Plato, or Aristotle, or Hegel, as products 
of their age, to recapture, if you will, the original intentions of their 
authors. Such works are philologically informed and very sensitive 
to historical context. The other form of scholarship is more 
concerned with taking philosophical ideas associated with the 
works of Plato, Aristotle, Hegel or others, and analyzing, refining, 
modifying and extending them in light of modem day issues and 
concerns. These scholars are less concerned with historical 
accuracy than with the cogency, power and philosophical 
coherence of their positions. Of course, these are tendencies and 
predilections rather than exclusive categories. Even the most 
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freewheeling post-modern Aristotelians or Hegelians feel a certain 
obligation to find a source for their idea in the writings of the 
Master. Even the most scrupulous historicists will explain that 
they study Plato in the original Attic Greek because his ideas are 
still relevant and important to us today. 
Accordingly, when we speak of the philosophy of Aristotle, or 
Hegel, or Nietzsche, we are speaking of both more and less than 
the philosophical ideas in the mind of a single individual who 
wrote books many years ago. We are speaking about a set of 
ideas, and perceptions of those ideas, which had their historical 
origins in the writings of a specific individual, but which can and do 
change in response to subsequent events. 
This paper is titled Nietzsche and the Nazis: The Impact of 
National Socialism on the Philosophy of Nietzsche. I hope that my 
prior discussion of causation and philosophical history makes it 
clear that this title is neither a misprint, nor an impossibility, nor a 
categoty mistake. Rather, it is an attempt to examine how the 
extensive adoption, interpretation and use of Nietzschean 
philosophical concepts by the Nazi regime, including, most 
importantly, the philosophers and interpreters of Nazi ideology, 
have affected and influenced the perception and interpretations of 
Nietzschean philosophy in the periods that followed. The 
existence of such an impact seems both undeniable and inevitable. 
Nietzsche was by far the most prominent and respected 
philosopher utilized by the Nazis as a source and justification for 
their ideology. Nietszchean concepts pervade Nazi propaganda, as 
well as the more academic work of Nazi philosophers. Indeed, it is 
not an exaggeration to say that Nietzsche's work occupied a 
position of influence and authority in Nazi Germany not unlike 
that of Marx' work in the Soviet Union. 
For post-Nazi era interpreters of Nietzsche, the central role 
that Nietzschean philosophy played in the Third Reich is an 
unavoidable fact, yet one that poses enormous difficulty for 
subsequent scholarship. For the many who find Nietzschean 
philosophy briUiant, deeply rewarding of intense study, and the 
source of powerful insights about humanity and the world, must 
somehow explain how the most brutal and murderous regime in 
the histo^ of the world, and a nation with considerable 
philosophical sophistication, could find justification and support in 
those same works. 
It is tempting perhaps, to say that the use of Nietzschean 
philosophy by the Nazis was largely pretextual, that Nietzsche was 
not so much the source of Nazi ideology as a convenient prop, a 
famous name to lend some intellectual respectability to the brutal. 
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racist and stupid ideas that made up the true Nazi ideology. There 
is undoubtedly much truth to this. Yet the fact remains that when 
the Nazi apologists sought an intellectual forebear to justify their 
horrific regime, they had the whole rich German philosophical 
tradition to choose from. It was no accident that they chose 
Nietzsche rather than Kant, or Hegel, or Liebniz. They saw 
something in Nietzschean philosophy that they could use. Indeed, 
they saw many things. 
It is also tempting to say that the Nazis perverted the 
philosophy of Nietzsche, distorted many concepts, like the 
ubermensch, so that they were vastly different from their original 
meaning, and simply ignored other Nietzschean concepts that were 
incompatible with Nazi ideology. Again, there is undoubtedly 
much truth to this. But in order for this to be a fully satisfactory 
answer to the problem of Nietzsche and the Nazis, one must 
explain why certain accounts of Nietzschean philosophy which 
modify some concepts and de-emphasize others constitute 
"perversions" of the philosophy, while others are merely 
"interpretations." In short, one needs not just a theory of 
interpretation, but also a theory that will enable one to recognize 
incorrect, invalid or perverted interpretations of complex and 
ambiguous texts. In our post-modern world, informed, in no small 
part, by the philosophy of Nietzsche itself, it is hard to find such 
theories and harder still to believe in them. These statements are 
not meant as an indictment either of Nietzsche or of Nietzschean 
philosophy. Rather, they are intended to elucidate the way in 
which the Nazis' use of Nietzschean philosophy created deep and 
serious issues for the subsequent understanding of Nietzschean 
philosophy. 
Let me be perfectly clear. I am not arguing, as some have 
previously done, that Nietzschean philosophy was, in fact, a 
forerunner of Nazi ideology, or at least contained the seeds of 
Nazism in some of its aspects. Even less plausible and more 
repugnant is the claim that Nietzsche himself was a proto-Nazi or 
had any sympathy for Nazi ideas and doctrines. I will stipulate 
that Nietzsche himself, unlike his egregious sister, was not an anti-
Semite, but tended rather to philo-Semitism. He was not a 
German nationalist, but generally espoused a pan-European 
perspective. Indeed, to the extent that any ahistorical statements 
can be made with certainty, it seems certain to me that the 
historical Nietzsche would have been disgusted and repelled by 
Nazi ideas and Nazi ideology. However, except for those who are 
willing to limit the proper interpretative scope of a text to the 
ascertainment of the actual intentions of its author, I do not see 
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how this fact makes much of a difference to the problem I am 
posing. 
Because it is an equally undeniable fact that the Nazis 
interpreted Nietzsche. They studied him assiduously, quoted him 
extensively, analyzed and expanded on key concepts, de-
emphasized others and even "corrected" his "mistakes." In short, 
the Nazis engaged in pretty much the same enterprise we 
recognize as the study of philosophy, and concluded that the 
philosophy of Nietzsche anticipated and justified their goals of 
world domination and racial hegemony. These were not people 
lacking in philosophical sophistication. Indeed, it is probably the 
case that during the 1930s and early 1940s, the philosophers of the 
Third Reich constituted the most active and well-trained 
"interpretive community" of Nietzschean scholars in the world. 
TTiis paper is divided into two parts. The first part, which 
draws mainly from the excellent book by Steven Aschheim, The 
Nietzsche Legacy in Germany 1890-1990,^ provides a brief 
overview of the facts concerning the relationship of Nietzschean 
philosophy to national socialism, and seeks to describe the ways in 
which certain key Nietzschean concepts were understood and 
interpreted by philosophers during the Nazi period. The second 
part of this paper examines the ways in which writings about 
Nietzsche in the post-Nazi period have responded to the Nazis' 
interpretation and use of Nietzschean philosophy. I will seek to 
set out a brief taxonomy of responses to the Nazi interpretations of 
Nietszchean philosophy, both as a means of understanding some 
post-Nazi writing about Nietzsche and the impact that national 
sociahsm has had on the philosophy of Nietzsche. 
I. NIETZSCHEAN PHILOSOPHY DURING THE NAZI PERIOD 
During the 1930s and 1940s, the association of Nietzschean 
philosophy with national socialism was considered by many 
philosophically trained individuals to be quite evident and obvious. 
This view was held by many (but not all) Nazi proponents and 
sympathizers, and also by many strongly opposed to the Nazi 
regime, as well as philosophically trained individuals who were 
ambivalent about the rise of national sociahsm. Even before the 
Nazis obtained power, Nietzsche had become the favorite 
philosopher of the radical right in post-World War I Germany. A 
key figure in this development was Alfred Baumler, a professor of 
1 STEVEN E. ASCHHEIM, THE NIETZSCHE LEGACY IN GERMANY 1890-1990 (1992). 
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philosophy at the University of Berlin who was to become the 
Third Reich's authorized Nietzsche scholar. As early as 1931, 
Baumler portrayed Nietzsche as a prophet of Nazism, a primarily 
political thinker whose writings predicted the revolutionary 
conflicts in European society which the Nazis sought to bring 
about. Other well established Nietzscheans of the pre-Nazi period 
saw the rise of national socialism as a Nietzschean revolution 
which both fulfilled and elucidated the meaning of Nietzsche's 
work. For example, Ernst Horneffer, an editor of the Nietzsche 
Archive who in the pre-Nazi period is described by Ascheim as one 
of the foremost champions of a neo-pagan "Germanic 
Nietzscheanism'" had by 1934 become a committed Nazi who 
declared that Nietzsche did not belong to the nineteenth century 
but to "our time. It is as if he lingered on living among us.'" 
Similarly, Gottfried Benn, a talented German expressionist whose 
work in the pre-Nazi period focused on Nietzschean nihilism and 
the death of God, saw, in national socialism, at least for a time, the 
possibility of a transcendent Nietzschean community that was both 
"primal and future oriented,"" since it portended the creation of a 
"new biological type—^the Aryan, whose great task it was to do 
battle against decadence in all its guises."^ 
Whatever other sins these Nietzschean Nazis were guilty of, it 
seems clear from Ascheim's account that they were not insincere. 
They recognized that there were important differences and 
inconsistencies between the writings of Nietzsche and the 
doctrines of national socialism (although they obviously believed 
that the affinities and similarities were even greater). Accordingly, 
they developed a hermeneutics of Nietzschean thought which not 
only permitted reinterpretations and new understandings of 
Nietzsche's work, but actually justified such reinterpretations as 
superior to contemporaneous nineteenth century understandings 
of Nietzsche, including perhaps, even those of Nietzsche himself. 
On this view, it was the triumph of the Nazi regime itself which for 
the first time made a full understanding of Nietzsche possible. 
This was the meaning of Ernst Elomeffer's statement that 
Nietzsche belongs "to our own time." It was echoed by Alfred 
Rosenberg's statement in 1944 that only "in our time" was a true 
appreciation of Nietzsche possible.® 
At the level of popular culture in the Third Reich, these 
2 W. at 222. 
3 Id. at 236. 
Id. at 68. 
5 Id. at 69. 
« Id. at 231. 
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hermeneutic issues were cast aside, and Nietzsche was simply 
portrayed as the great prophet of the Nazi revolution. In the 
words of Franz Neumann, Nietzsche "provided National Socialism 
with an intellectual father who had greatness and wit, whose style 
was beautiful and not abominable, who was able to articulate the 
resentment against both monopoly capitalism and the rising 
proletariat."' At a ceremony commemorating Germany's victory 
over Russia in the First World War, three books were placed in the 
Tannenberg Memorial: Mein Kampf, Alfred Rosenberg's Myth of 
the Twentieth Century, and Thus Spake Zarathustra.^ Nietzschean 
concepts provided a critical source and justification for many of 
the policies and reforms advocated in the Third Reich. Assaults 
on scientific objectivity were made in the name of Nietzsche, "the 
intellectual Fuhrer to a new culture." Concepts of universal law 
and equal rights based on immanent reason were rejected in favor 
of a Nietzschean conception of law as embodying "the strong 
unbreakable tie of the law to the power-pohtical necessity of every 
Yolk." Eugenic measures were justified by Nietzschean concepts 
of biologism and the doctrine of "holy cruelty." Yet, as Aschheim 
reminds us, although Nietzsche's works were published and 
distributed throughout the Third Reich "at a dizzy pace," those 
published works first went through a process of "appropriate 
editing.'" 
Although Nietzsche was in some respects the official 
philosopher of the Third Reich, unlike Hitler and the Nazi regime 
itself, he was not immune from criticism. It was possible in the 
Nazi era to espouse philosophies and doctrines totally antithetical 
to Nietzscheanism, to criticize Nietzschean concepts as wrong or 
incoherent, just so long as one remained a committed Nazi. For 
example, the Nietzschean rejection of objective value was 
criticized by neo-Kantian German philosophers, who argued that 
such a concept of objective value was necessary to ground the 
doctrines of national sociahsm. They sought to reinterpret 
Nietzsche not as a proponent of extreme relativism but as 
someone whose insights could be limited to an a posteriori account 
of human will and action.'" 
More severe critics of Nietzsche than the neo-Kantians were 
representatives of the Christian churches, who recognized in 
Nietzsche a powerful antagonist. Despite the expurgated nature of 
the Nietzschean texts being published in Germany, these critics 
^ Mat235. 
8 Id. at 239. 
9 Id. at 245. 
10 See id. at 256. 
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had no difficulty citing Nietzsche's "antinationalist, antiracist and 
pro-Jewish positions" as grounds for his rejection as philosopher of 
national socialism." The fact that these groups and many other 
anti-Nietzscheans were free to criticize Nietzsche as insufficiently 
reflective of true national socialism indicates that the many other 
German intellectuals, including most German Nietzscheans, who 
saw Nietzsche as the great prophet and forerunner of national 
socialism were likely to have held such views sincerely, a reflection 
of serious study of Nietzsche's work, and not merely to ingratiate 
themselves with the current regime. 
Even more indicative of the widespread belief among 
intellectuals in Nazi Germany that Nietzsche was the great 
philosopher of national sociahsm was the acceptance of this idea 
among intellectuals trained in other traditions. After all, for 
Nietzscheans like Baumler and Homeffer, the association of 
Nietzsche with national socialism, however sincerely held, was also 
a good career move given their chosen specialty. It is even more 
significant, therefore, that many non-Nietzscheans, both in and 
outside the Third Reich, saw essentially the same connection. We 
have already noted how German neo-Kantians, in an attempt to 
provide the proper philosophical grounding for national socialism, 
sought to merge Kant and Nietzsche. Outside the Third Reich, in 
1934, Carl Jung began a five-year marathon seminar analyzing 
Nietzsche's Zarathustra. The analysis, of course, was a Jungian 
one, with Jung detecting a powerful resonance between 
Nietzsche's unconscious and the collective unconscious of modem 
man, particularly in the form it was taking in Nazi Germany. 
Jung's statements in that seminar indicate a deep ambivalence 
about the Nazi regime, praising it faintly at times and referring to 
"this modem pohtical evil" at others. He did not waver, however, 
in his identification of Nietzsche with events in Nazi Germany, 
describing Nietzsche as "in a way the great prophet of what is 
happening in Germany" yet also viewing the actually Nazi 
understanding of Nietzsche's work as somewhat crude and 
pathological." 
Finally, there is Heidegger. The extent to which Heidegger 
supported national socialism in the early years of the Nazi regime, 
and had, by his own account, rejected it by the late 1930s, is a 
complex and much debated issue. What appears beyond dispute, 
however, is that for Heidegger, his position on national sociahsm 
was inextricably tied to his acceptance or rejection of 
Nietzscheanism. While Heidegger's works, particularly in the 
11 Mat 254. 
1^ See id. at 260-62. 
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early 1930s, contain positive references to Nietzsche and 
Nietzschean concepts, Heidegger claimed to have broken with 
Nazism by the late 1930s, and cited as evidence of that his lectures 
on Nietzsche in 1936-1937 and in 1939-40 which have been 
pubhshed and translated as a four-volume treatise titled 
''Nietzsche." The extent to which these lectures constitute a 
repudiation of Nazism is certainly open to debate, although they 
clearly reject the sort of simplified political Nietzsche of Baumler 
and other Nietzschean Nazis. For our purposes, it is sufficient to 
note that Heidegger too viewed his positions on Nietzsche to be 
intimately linked to his position on national socialism. 
In short, there can be no serious dispute that during the Nazi 
period, Nietzschean philosophy was strongly identified with 
national socialism, was seen as providing Nazism with intellectual 
depth and potential philosophical justification. This view was held 
not only by Nietzschean scholars in the Third Reich, but by 
German intellectuals trained in other philosophical traditions, as 
well as by many non-German, non-Nazi intellectuals. 
Yet Nietzschean pronouncements were never accepted 
blindly. Despite the expurgated versions used as school texts, 
Nietzschean scholars were well aware that while many Nietzschean 
concepts seemed compatible with or even to instantiate basic 
principles of national sociahsm, others Nietzschean concepts 
seemed incompatible or downright subversive to Nazi ideas. 
Intellectual work was required by Nietzchean Nazis so that these 
latter concepts could be reinterpreted, clarified and understood in 
new ways. 
Among the Nietzschean concepts favored by the Nazis was 
undoubtedly the "will to power." The notion that one could 
escape nihilistic despair by an act of will whereby good and evil 
were transcended to create a more primitive, vital and natural 
society seemed like a thorough endorsement of the basic goals and 
methods of the Nazi regime. Similarly, the concepts of 
ubermensch and the much less used Nietzschean term, 
untermensch, were also of immense value to the Nazis in providing 
intellectually respectable pedigrees to brutal racist categories." 
The Nazis also found much value and support in Nietzsche's 
biologism, his emphasis on bodily health and vigor. Unlike their 
racial and nationahst agendas, the Nazi policies of eugenics and 
euthanasia, as well as repression of homosexuals, could be clearly 
and easily justified by quotations from Nietzschean texts. Hadn't 
Nietzsche written in The Will to Power that "[s]5mipathy for 
See id. at 237. 
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decadents, equal rights for the ill-constituted—^that would be the 
profoundest immorality, that would be antinature itself as 
morality!"?!^ 
What about those Nietzschean concepts which appeared 
inconsistent with Nazi doctrine? Different concepts created 
different levels of difficulty. Nietzsche's rejection of collective 
values in favor of a heroic individualism, for example, could be 
modified by emphasizing those statements where Nietzsche saw 
the individual as part of a larger historical destiny, and by 
Nietzsche's biologism, which often manifested itself in discussions 
of the vitality of various "races" and species. Nietzsche's rejection 
of nineteenth century German nationalism and his vision of the 
"good European" was converted by the Nazis into a useful 
recruiting tool among non-German Europeans sympathetic to the 
Nazi cause. Non-German volimteers for the Waffen SS, (and 
there were a significant number) were often inspired by a 
Nietzschean vision of good Europeans forging a new, war-like 
aristocracy of the future.^' 
With respect to Nietzsche's many condemnations of anti-
Semitism and "the race swindle" however, the Nazis needed and 
discovered a more radical reinterpretation of Nietzsche. Aside 
from Baumler's assertion that, in his personal life, Nietzsche really 
didn't care much for Jews at all, they pointed to Nietzsche's 
many attacks on Christianity and priestly religion generally as 
indications of his true and much more thoroughgoing anti-
Semitism. Nietzsche's statements in, for example. Genealogy of 
Morals, where Christianity itself is presented as a secret Jewish 
plot, through which "Israel, with its vengefulness and revaluation 
of all values, has hitherto triumphed again and again over all other 
ideals, over all nobler ideals"" was be viewed as a form of anti-
Christian anti-Semitism, and the "nobler values" presumed to be 
the Volkish ideology of the Third Reich. As for Nietzsche's claim 
that there were no pure races and his suspicion of the "race 
swindle," these were viewed as merely an empirical mistake on his 
part, ameliorated by Nietzsche's obvious concern for eugenics and 
racial improvement.'® 
In short, it is beyond dispute that during the Nazi period. 
" FRIEDRICH NIETZSCHE, THE WILL TO POWER para 734, at 389 (Walter Kaufman 
ed., Walter Kaufman & R. J. Hollingdale trans., 1967). See generally ASCHHEIM, supra 
note 1, at 243. 
See ASCHHEIM, supra note 1, at 247-48. 
16 See id. at 250. 
11 FRIEDRICH NIETZSCHE, On the Genealogy of Morals, in BASIC WRITINGS OF 
NIETZSCHE 439,471 (Walter Kaufmann ed. & trans., 1968). 
1^ See ASCHHEIM, supra note 1, at 244. 
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many and probably most scholars and intellectuals, Nietzscheans 
and non-Nietzscheans, Nazis and non-Nazis, geniuses and 
intellectual hacks, all viewed Nietzsche as a forerunner, a source 
and a potential justification for national socialist ideas and 
practices. 
11. THE EFFECT OF NATIONAL SOCIALISM ON THE PHILOSOPHY 
OF NIETZSCHE 
What are we to make of the strong identification of Nietzsche 
with Nazi ideology during the period of the Third Reich? For 
many, particularly in the immediate post-war period, it led to the 
condemnation of Nietzsche and Nietzschean philosophy. After all, 
if most of the trained Nietzschean experts, or if you prefer, most of 
the Nietzschean interpretive community, identified Nietzsche with 
Nazi ideas, wasn't the characterization of Nietzsche as a proto-
Nazi likely to be correct? This argument has, of course, raged for 
years, and I am not going to add anything to it here, except to 
point out that the argument itself only makes sense if one takes a 
fairly determinate view regarding the meaning and interpretation 
of texts. That is, if you believe the writings of Nietzsche have a 
fixed and determinate meaning which can be ascertained through 
the correct hermeneutic process, then the question of whether the 
ideas set forth in the Nietzschean texts corresponds to those of the 
Nazis is at least intelligible and coherent, if not necessarily 
answerable. 
If, however, one is inclined to view the meaning of texts, 
particularly complex aphoristic ones, as relatively indeterminate, 
malleable and contingent over time, then the fact that a text has 
been interpreted a certain way at a particular time sheds little light 
on its actual meaning. Indeed the very project of ascertaining true 
or actual meaning begins to seem misguided. 
However, recognition of the indeterminacy of textual 
interpretation raises a different question, a question not about the 
meaning of Nietzsche prior to the Nazis, but about the meaning of 
Nietzsche after the Nazis. If the interpretation and understanding 
of Nietzsche is indeed relatively indeterminate, malleable, and 
contingent over time, then how have the meaning of those texts 
been affected by the indisputable fact that they can be and have 
been interpreted and understood to justify the most evil and 
destructive regime in world history? The facts concerning the Nazi 
interpretation of Nietzsche, the knowledge that such vicious, evil 
readings of the texts are available, that they were made, debated 
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and believed by serious scholars, must necessarily inform the work 
and the interpretations of every student of Nietzsche who has 
written about him since that time. In the pages that follow, I will 
attempt to give a preliminary taxonomy of the kinds of responses 
that this knowledge has generated in post-Nazi writings about 
Nietzsche. 
The first response, perhaps unsurprisingly, is denial, both 
implicit and explicit, a refusal to recognize that the Nazi 
interpretations of Nietzsche could possibly constitute sincere, 
genuine and sophisticated understandings of the texts. Consider, 
for example, the essay by Walter Kaufmann which introduces his 
translations of the Basic Writings of NietzscheN In that essay, 
Kaufmann talks about the widespread influence of Nietzsche's 
works, not only on philosophers, but on hterature, psychology and 
other humanistic endeavors. Among the many he names as 
influenced by Nietzschean ideas are Freud, Sartre, Buber, Camus, 
Malraux, Bernard Shaw, James Joyce, and virtually every 
"German philosopher of note" since Nietzsche's time, with the 
single exception of Husserl.^" Of course, most of these people 
cannot by the broadest stretch of the imagination be considered 
faithful interpreters of Nietzsche, and Kaufmann makes no such 
claim. Rather he says that they were people on whose work 
Nietzsche's ideas had an impact. For example, Kaufmann 
approvingly quotes Freud's statement that Nietzsche's 
"premonitions and insights often agree in the most amazing 
manner with the laborious results of psychoanalysis," and states 
that some of Sartre's best known hterary works contain "dozens 
of echoes of Nietzsche's writings." But Kaufmann's listing of the 
various intellectual influences of Nietzsche in the twentieth 
century, extensive though it is, contains a curious omission. 
Clearly there was another group of influential thinkers in the early 
twentieth century who also believed that Nietzsche's work 
contained "premonitions and insights" that often agreed with their 
own, and whose work also often contains "echoes of Nietzsche's 
writings." Yet Kaufmann chooses simply to exclude Nazis and 
Nazi thought from his otherwise expansive list of those influenced 
by Nietzsche's works. 
Later in the same essay, Kaufmann explicitly rejects the claim 
that Nietzsche was a "Nazi philosopher" as an "absurdity" that can 
only be held by those showing either "rank ignorance" or "an 
See generally Introduction to FRIEDRICH NIETZSCHE, BASIC WRITINGS OF 
NIETZSCHE (Walter Kaufmann ed. & trans., 1%8). 
^ Id at ix-x. 
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incredible lack of intellectual integrity."^' As a lawyer, I perceive 
in these words a familiar litigation strategy—^restate your 
opponent's position in the weakest formulation possible, and then 
attack it vigorously. Kaufmann can easily deny that Nietzsche was 
a Nazi. He can much less easily deny that Nietzschean ideas had 
an impact on Nazi thought, or that all those who saw parallels 
between Nietzschean ideas and Nazi thought were either ignorant 
or guilty of a lack of intellectual integrity. Yet Kaufmann 
dedicated his life to a noble attempt to deny precisely that. His 
translations and commentaries on Nietzsche, written after the Nazi 
period, are designed to set forth an authoritative, positive, non-
Nazi interpretation of Nietzsche as the only intellectually honest 
possible reading. Like many forceful advocates, however, 
Kaufmann is always in danger of overstating his case. In 
attempting to deny that anything in Nietzsche's writings can 
plausibly be interpreted to support Nazi ideas, he offers, as 
authoritative, positive readings of Nietzsche, concepts that are no 
more inherently plausible than the Nazi concepts they are 
intended to replace. For example, in footnotes to his translation of 
the term "blond beast" in Genealogy of Morals, Kaufmann takes 
pains to provide a non-racial interpretation, associating blondness 
with "the beast, the lion" rather than with Aryans. While this 
reading is not clearly wrong, it is certainly hard to reconcile with 
the phrase "blond Germanic beast" which appears in the very next 
paragraph of the Genealogy}^ 
The project of denying the validity of the Nazi interpretation 
of Nietzsche by positing a correct authoritative non-Nazi reading 
of Nietzsche runs afoul of many of the same problems that the 
Nazi interpreters of Nietzsche encountered. Indeed, it threatens to 
become a mirror image of the Nazi project. Some concepts fit 
easily into a positive non-Nazi reading of Nietzsche, but others, the 
will to power, the ubermensch, the Blond Beast, the very concepts 
the Nazis found so congenial, must be de-emphasized or 
reinterpreted or suppressed. 
A second, rather different response to the Nazi interpretation 
of Nietzsche is what we might call "radical indeterminacy." This 
view denies the validity of the Nazi interpretation of Nietzsche by 
denying the possibility of making any single positive interpretation 
of Nietzschean works. Nietzsche's writings readily lend themselves 
to such a reading containing, as they do, contradictory statements 
on some matters, vague and aphoristic statements on many others, 
and a plethora of different styles and statements on many matters. 
Id. at xii. 
22 NIETZSCHE, supra note 17, at 477-78. 
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including the nature of truth itself. The problem is how to give an 
account of such radical indeterminacy without making Nietzsche's 
work appear hopelessly confused and incoherent. 
One of the earliest thinkers to adopt this approach was Karl 
Jaspers. His book on Nietzsche, written in 1936, was a clear 
challenge to those Nazi thinkers, like Baumler, who sought to find 
in Nietzsche a coherent pohtical philosophy. Instead, Jaspers 
emphasized the contradictions in Nietzsche's thought. He stated 
that one could ground a Nazi position "down to every detail" in 
Nietzsche's work, but that "one can see the exactly opposite 
position represented by Nietzsche with equal vehemence."^^ For 
Jaspers, Nietzsche's method was to embrace contradiction in order 
to free the mind from all ideological and other conceptual 
constraints, in order to achieve "systematically conscious 
domination of one's own thinking." 
Another philosopher I would place in this same radical 
indeterminist tradition is Jacques Derrida. Although Derrida does 
not write expressly about Nazi interpretations of Nietzsche, in his 
famous essay. Spurs, Derrida confronts a more commonly 
accepted charge against Nietzsche, his hatred of women. Where 
others have found in Nietzsche's work only "incurable misogyny," 
Derrida finds three contradictory positions. First, "[wjoman is 
condemned, debased and despised as a figure or power of 
falsehood." Second, "Woman is condemned and despised as a 
figure or power of truth." Finally, "Beyond this double negation, 
woman is recognized, affirmed as a power of affirmation, 
dissimulation, as an artist, a dionysiac."^"* Accordingly, there is no 
single true Nietzschean position on women or any way of arriving 
at one, and if there is no Nietzschean truth about woman, neither 
is there a Nietzschean truth about anything else. As Derrida tells 
us: 
[Tjhere is no one truth of Nietzsche or of his text. The phrase 
one reads in Beyond Good and Evil, "these are only—^my 
truths" My truths implies no doubt that these are not 
truths because they are multiple, variegated, contradictory. 
There is no one truth in itself, but what is more, even for me, 
even about me, the truth is plural."^ 
Of course, this Derridean position makes statements about 
Nietzsche which are themselves subject to a radical indeterminist 
23 KARL JASPERS, Reply to My Critics, in THE PHILOSOPHY OF KARL JASPERS 857-63 
(Paul Arthur Schilpp ed., 1957). 
2^ JACQUES DERRIDA, Spurs: Nietzsche's Syles, in A DERRIDA READER: BETWEEN 
THE BLINDS 370-71 (Peggy Kamuf ed., 1991). 
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critique, but that is a subject for a different day, (or at least a 
different panel). 
A third category of reaction is what we might call the 
dialectical response to the Nazi interpretation of Nietzsche. These 
thmkers considered the Nazi interpretation of Nietzsche a 
misreading, but not an ignorant or pretextual misreading. Rather, 
applying a dialectical approach to Nietzschean interpretation, they 
viewed the Nazi embrace of Nietzsche as an understandable, even 
predictable view of Nietzsche which was the product of the social, 
economic and psychological conditions under which it was made. 
These dialectical thinkers see Nietzsche as a prophetic voice who 
was doomed to be misunderstood, perhaps did not even fully 
understand his own message, but whose works helped propel a 
process whereby a fuller understanding of his own significance 
could later be achieved. 
The paradigmatic work in this category is Adomo and 
Horkheimer's Dialectic of Enlightenment. Although utilizing 
concepts of dialectical reasoning derived from Hegel and Marx, 
Adomo and Horkheimer apply these insights to the 
Enlightenment itself, which is seen as simultaneously a tool for 
both popular liberation and oppression. Nietzsche, on this view, 
was one of the few nineteenth century thinkers to recognize the 
potential for oppression, the "nihilistic anti-hfe force" inherent in 
the progressivism of the Enlightenment. Adomo and Horkheimer 
compare Nietzsche to that other great flouter of nineteenth 
century enlightenment values, the Marquis de Sade, and see 
Nietzsche and Sade's Juliette as engaged in similar projects of 
critiquing the oppressiveness of Enlightenment thought and 
asserting a vital primitive resistance against concepts of rationality 
and conventional morality. 
For Adorno and Horkheimer, the context in which 
Nietzschean ideas are set forth is critical. The Nazi exaltation of 
power, strength and barbarism over civilization and morality were 
indeed Nietzschean themes, but when coming from a little-read 
nineteenth century philosopher such statements were liberating 
attacks on a dominant world-view. Their adoption by a State 
power inevitably distorted and converted them to an instrument of 
oppression. As Adomo and Horkheimer state: 
By raising the cult of strength to a world-historical doctrine, 
German Fascism also took it to an absurd extreme. As a 
protest against civilization, the master's morality conversely 
represents the oppressed. Hatred of atrophied instincts actually 
denounces the true nature of the task-masters—^which comes to 
light only in their victims. But as a Great Power, or state 
religion, the master's morality wholly subscribes to the civilizing 
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powers that be, the compact majority, the resentment, and 
everything that it formerly opposed. The realization of 
Nietzsche's assertions both refutes them and at the same time 
reveals their truth, which—despite all his affirmation of life— 
was inimiccil to the spirit of reality.^® 
Georges Bataille, another prominent post-war thinker 
strongly influenced by Nietzsche, also views Nietzsche from a 
dialectical perspective, not a dialectic of world-historical events, 
but a dialectic of personal liberation struggle. Like Adorno and 
Horkheimer, he sees de Sade, along with Nietzsche, as the two 
great nineteenth century apostles of total liberation, of freedom 
from conscience and rationality. Yet Bataille's deep ambivalence 
about the Nietzschean project of liberation comes from his own 
attempts to live it. He tells us that "Nietzsche's work, seen from 
the perspective of action, is an abortion—a. strongly defensible 
one; his life is a failed life, like that which attempts to put his 
writing into action." 
For Bataille, Nietzsche cannot be understood by simply 
reading him, but only by living the same struggle he lived. All 
mere readings of Nietzsche, therefore, including the Nazis', are 
inevitably misreadings: 
One has truly not heard a single word of Nietzsche's unless one 
has lived this signal dissolution in totality; without it, this 
philosophy is a mere labyrinth of contradictions, and worse, the 
pretext for lying by omission (if, like the fascists, one isolates 
passages for purposes which negate the rest of the work).^^ 
Missing from all the previously discussed responses to Nazi 
Nietzscheanism is any feeling of comphcity or responsibility. All 
these various commentators seem quite sure that what the Nazis 
saw and valued in Nietzsche is quite different from what they find 
valuable and powerful in his work, whether it be Kaufman's 
positive non-Nazi Nietzcheism, Jaspers and Derrida's radical 
indeterminacy, or the dialectic perspectives of Adorno, 
Horkheimer and Bataille. 
Another position is of course possible, a position which states 
that the concepts that the Nazis saw and valued in Nietzsche are 
indeed an essential and valuable part of Nietzsche. This does not 
imply that Nietzsche was in any sense a Nazi philosopher, far less 
that Nazism was a correct or necessary result of Nietszchean 
thought. But it does lead to what we might call a tragic view of 
26 MAX HORKHEIMER & THEODOR W. ADORNO, DIALECTIC OF ENLIGHTENMENT 
100-01 (John Cumming trans., 1972). 
27 GEORGES BATAILLE, On Nietzsche: The Will to Chance, in THE BATAILLE 
READER 340 (Fred Betting & Scott Wilson eds., 1997). 
754 CARDOZO LAW REVIEW [Vol. 24:2 
Nietszchean philosophy, of a set of ideas whose power does indeed 
transcend good and evil, whose conscious ambiguity both reveals 
and obscures, and whose potential for unleashing barbarity upon 
the world must be recognized and regretted. Although there does 
not appear to be any post-war philosopher who has adopted this 
view, it is the pervasive theme of Thomas Mann's great post-war 
novel. Doctor Faustus. 
Mann himself seems to have had reservations about Doctor 
Faustus as a literary work. He called it "joylessly earnest, not 
artistically happy." The impact of the book lies as much in its 
allegorical power as in its novelistic technique. It tells the story of 
Adrian Leverkuhn, a brilhant, driven and solitary composer, who 
seeks in his work to shatter all artistic norms, who contracts 
syphihs, and who goes mad. Leverkuhn obviously represents 
Nietzsche, whose life and illness are paralleled in many respects, 
but he also represents the German nation, itself descending into 
madness and destruction, as well as the legendary Faust. 
Leverkuhn, however, is not seduced or deceived by the Devil, but 
has actively sought him, has made his pact willingly, even before 
the Devil himself arrives to seal it. 
The story of Leverkuhn is narrated in the novel by his friend, 
Serenus Zeitblom, an earnest, pedantic, and thoroughly 
conventional man, whose own reactions and responses to 
Leverkuhn and to the Nazi tragedy are the central theme of the 
book. Zeitblom himself describes the book as "a monumental 
work of lamentation" and so it is. Mann clearly saw a link 
between the works of Nietzsche and the Nazi catastrophe, and 
whether that is an accurate portrayal of the relationship is less 
important than the fact that it was so viewed. Doctor Faustus, 
therefore, is not so much about Nietzsche as about the perception 
of Nietzsche, while recognizing that reality and perception are not 
only linked, but indistinguishable. The dominant mode of the 
book is indeed one of lamentation, not condenmation. 
Leverkuhn's work is brilhant, exhilarating, frightening and 
dangerous. Yet viewed, as Mann and Zeitblom view it, with 
knowledge of the madness and destruction that were to foUow, it is 
also, and perhaps predominantly, tragic. 
Let me conclude then with a quotation from Doctor Faustus, a 
description of Leverkuhn's music, which may also be taken as a 
description of Nietzsche's writing, and must therefore also be 
taken as a description of the perception of Nietzsche's writing in 
the aftermath of the Nazi destruction: 
Yes, in the contemplation of this music, admiration and 
sadness mingled in the most peculiar way. "How beautiful!" 
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one's heart said—or at least mine said to itself—"and how sad!" 
For what one admired was a wittily melancholy work of art, an 
intellectual feat worthy of the name heroic, laconic anguish 
behaving like playful travesty—^which I do not know how to 
characterize other than to call it an unrelenting, tense, 
breakneck game played by art at the very edge of impossibility. 
And that was what made one sad.^ 
THOMAS MANN, DOCTOR FAUSTUS 233 (John E. Woods trans., 1997). 
